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Abstract	
	
After	errors,	humans	and	monkeys	dynamically	change	decision	boundaries	which	results	in	post-
error	slowing	of	decisions.	Simultaneously	decreased	sensitivity	to	sensory	information	counteracts	
post-error	increases	in	accuracy.	Early	post-error	adjustments	thus	reflect	rather	a	general	orienting	
reflex	than	goal-directed	adaptation.	
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After	a	mistake	people	often	slow	down	their	subsequent	actions.	This	post-error	slowing	(PES)	
(Rabbitt,	1966)	has	been	found	for	various	cognitive	activities,	such	as	reaction	time	tasks,	lexical	
decisions,	and	typewriting.	Is	it	adaptive	to	slow	down	after	errors?	It	would,	if	it	reflected	a	more	
cautious	response	mode	providing	the	basis	for	more	accurate	behavior	in	forthcoming	trials	
(Ridderinkhof	et	al.,	2004).	In	line	with	this	assumption,	theories	of	cognitive	control	suggest	that	
after	errors	motor	responses	are	inhibited,	for	example	by	raising	the	threshold	that	motor	cortex	
activity	needs	to	exceed	to	elicit	an	overt	action	(Botvinick	et	al.,	2001).	Such	speed-accuracy	tradeoff	
would	entail	higher	accuracy	(i.e.,	lower	error	likelihood)	on	post-error	trials.	However,	only	a	few	
studies	have	shown	associations	of	PES	with	increased	post-error	accuracy.		Often	post-error	changes	
in	accuracy	and	reaction	time	were	uncoupled	or	even	in	opposition	(see	Ullsperger	et	al.,	2014,	for	a	
review),	which	is	incompatible	with	a	speed-accuracy	account.	
Purcell	and	Kiani	(Purcell	and	Kiani,	2016)	have	addressed	this	issue	in	experiments	in	humans	and	
monkeys	performing	a	perceptual	decision	task.	Participants	had	to	make	a	saccade	according	to	the	
perceived	predominant	motion	direction	of	moving	dots.	After	feedback	indicating	an	error,	reaction	
times	in	the	following	trial	were	prolonged	while	accuracy	did	not	change;	in	other	words,	both	
species	showed	PES	that	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	simple	speed-accuracy	tradeoff.	Drift-diffusion	
models	(DDM)	which	accumulate	and	integrate	noisy	evidence	toward	decision	bounds	have	
successfully	explained	behavioral	and	neuronal	data	in	multiple	perceptual	decision-making	studies.	
By	fitting	a	DDM	to	the	data	the	authors	found	that	PES	can	be	explained	by	a	combination	of	an	
increased	decision	bound	and	a	reduction	of	the	accumulator’s	sensitivity	to	perceptual	information.	
The	reduced	sensitivity	thus	counteracted	the	to-be-expected	increase	in	accuracy	associated	with	
raised	decision	bounds.	Based	on	the	behavioral	data	alone,	one	cannot	distinguish	different	
potential	causes	for	the	observed	changes	in	decision	bound	and	sensitivity.	Recordings	of	single-
neuron	activity	in	the	monkey’s	lateral	intraparietal	cortex	(LIP),	a	region	known	to	host	neurons	
whose	firing	dynamics	represent	evidence-accumulation-to-bound	decision	signals	related	to	
saccades,	were	used	to	further	specify	the	mechanisms	of	PES.	LIP	responses	showed	typical	ramp-
like	increases	of	firing	rates	when	monkeys	chose	to	fixate	the	target	in	the	neuron’s	response	field.	
Interestingly,	the	static	features	of	the	ramp,	particularly	firing	at	start	and	end	point,	did	not	differ	
between	post-error	and	post-correct	trials;	rather	the	dynamics	of	the	ramp	itself	changed.	Again,	
this	could	be	explained	best	by	two	contributing	factors:	a	stimulus-independent	decrease	in	urgency	
and	a	stimulus-dependent	decrease	in	sensitivity.	Thus,	instead	of	a	static	decision	bound,	an	
urgency	signal	appears	to	lead	to	a	stimulus-independent	increase	of	firing	as	time	of	evidence	
accumulation	progresses.	This	urgency	signal,	which	in	DDMs	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	collapse	of	
the	boundaries	with	increasing	time,	was	weaker	on	post-error	trials,	which	in	turn	explains	the	
slowing.	Whether	the	assumption	of	an	urgency	signal	can	be	generalized	to	other	contexts	and	to	
decision	making	in	humans	has	been	a	matter	of	debate	(Hawkins	et	al.,	2015).	The	second	factor	
influencing	the	ramping	dynamics	in	monkey	LIP	neurons,	the	decrease	of	sensitivity	to	sensory	
information,	could	be	attributed	to	a	lower	evidence	signal	received	by	the	accumulator	rather	than	
increased	noise	in	the	accumulator	itself.	
Thus,	in	perceptual	decision	making,	PES	could	not	be	explained	by	a	mere	motor	inhibition	process	
but	it	also	entails	at	least	transiently	reduced	sensitivity	to	task-relevant	sensory	evidence.	The	study	
therefore	answers	the	question	whether	PES	is	adaptive	with	both	a	‘yes’	and	a	‘no’.	While	the	
decrease	in	perceptual	sensitivity	is	not	adaptive	for	the	task	at	hand	(but	could	still	provide	an	
advantage,	see	below),	the	change	in	decision	bound	seems	to	be	adaptive.	Nevertheless,	the	data	
speak	against	the	general	assumption	that	PES	serves	the	prevention	of	future	errors.		
The	motion	discrimination	task	used	by	the	authors	differs	from	tasks	that	have	been	used	to	study	
PES	in	humans	(e.g.	flanker	tasks)	in	several	respects.	For	example,	most	tasks	used	in	human	studies	
involve	no	feedback,	a	different	response	modality	(finger	movements	instead	of	saccades),	and	they	
often	involve	response	conflict	rather	than	uncertainty	at	the	stimulus	level.	However,	despite	these	
task	differences,	bounded	accumulation	models	have	been	shown	to	explain	behavior	in	these	tasks	
quantitatively	(Servant	et	al.,	2014),	suggesting	that	they	are	mechanistically	similar	but	with	
substantially	shorter	evidence	accumulation	times.	The	use	of	near-threshold	moving	stimuli	in	
perceptual	decision	making	task	significantly	lengthens	the	integration	time,	which	enables	to	dissect	
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crucial	components	of	the	decision-making	process	at	a	single-neuron	level.	Important	questions	for	
future	research	are	whether	the	decrease	in	sensitivity	to	sensory	information	generalizes	to	
‘classical’	response	conflict	tasks	and	what	would	then	be	the	equivalent	brain	area	to	LIP.	Another	
aspect	of	PES	that	has	been	shown	in	the	perceptual	decision	making	task	by	Purcell	and	Kiani	as	well	
as	in	response	conflict	tasks	in	humans	is	that	PES	decreases	with	increasing	time	between	the	
erroneous	response	and	the	subsequent	response	(Ullsperger	et	al.,	2014;	see	Fig.	1).	With	more	
systematic	investigations	future	studies	could	reveal	in	more	detail	for	how	long	the	change	in	
response	threshold	lasts.	
The	current	study	by	Purcell	and	Kiani	provides	novel	and	important	insights	into	the	mechanisms	of	
PES.	But	how	are	the	changes	in	boundary/urgency	and	sensitivity	implemented	neurobiologically?	
Previous	work	in	manual	tasks	has	demonstrated	that	error	monitoring	signals	in	the	posterior	
medial	frontal	cortex	correlate	with	subsequent	PES	and	with	reduced	hemodynamic	signals	in	the	
hand	area	of	primary	motor	cortex	(Ullsperger	et	al.,	2014).	Transcranial	magnetic	stimulation	
suggests	reduced	corticospinal	excitability	on	post-error	trials	(Amengual	et	al.,	2013).	Functional	and	
structural	connectivity	analyses	as	well	as	intracranial	recordings	suggest	that	activity	in	a	network	
triangulating	the	presupplementary	motor	area,	the	right	inferior	frontal	gyrus,	and	the	subthalamic	
nucleus	drives	PES	(Siegert	et	al.,	2014;	Ullsperger	et	al.,	2014;	Wessel	et	al.,	2015).	This	network	has	
been	associated	previously	with	general	motor	inhibition	and	boundary	shifts	in	decision	making	
(Aron	et	al.,	2014;	Bogacz	et	al.,	2010).	Whether	this	network	could	also	modulate	urgency	signals	as	
found	in	the	present	study	in	LIP	neurons	remains	to	be	established.		
Interestingly,	PES	seems	to	be	part	of	a	more	general	phenomenon:	an	orienting	reflex	elicited	by	
unexpected	events	of	potential	motivational	impact	(Notebaert	et	al.,	2009),	not	only	errors	but	also	
surprising	task-irrelevant	action	outcomes	(Wessel	et	al.,	2015).	Besides	slowing	of	reactions,	the	
orienting	reflex	entails	an	increase	in	arousal	reflected	in	activity	of	the	locus	ceruleus	and	the	
autonomic	nervous	system.	Resulting	noradrenaline	release	in	the	cortex	has	been	suggested	to	
induce	a	»reset«	“by	interrupting	existing	functional	networks	and	facilitating	the	emergence	of	new	
ones”	(Sara	and	Bouret,	2012;	p.	135)	which	allows	disengagement	of	selective	attention	from	its	
previous	focus	and	subsequent	(re)orientation	to	relevant	sensory	input.	We	speculate	that	this	
mechanism	could	explain	the	reduction	in	sensitivity	of	evidence	accumulation	in	LIP	to	sensory	input	
reported	by	Purcell	and	Kiani.	Such	a	general	arousal	effect	disengaging	selective	attention	may	also	
explain	the	somewhat	surprising	time	course	of	task-specific	post-error	attentional	adjustments:	
after	errors	resulting	from	distraction,	adaptive	increases	of	selective	attention	to	task-relevant	
sensory	input	were	found	only	two	or	more	trials	after	the	error,	whereas	disengagement	from	task-
irrelevant	(distracting)	inputs	seemed	to	occur	immediately	(Danielmeier	et	al.,	2015).	Thus,	we	
suggest	that	an	orienting	reflex,	comprising	reduced	perceptual	sensitivity	and	motor	inhibition,	
immediately	follows	an	error,	and	only	later	task-specific	adjustments,	like	increases	in	selective	
attention,	are	implemented	(Figure	1).	While	the	orienting	reflex	is	linked	to	noradrenaline	release,	a	
subsequent	increase	in	selective	attention	depends	on	cholinergic	modulations	in	task-relevant	
sensory	brain	areas	(Danielmeier	et	al.,	2015).	However,	these	assumptions	as	well	as	specific	time	
courses	of	these	processes	need	to	be	tested	in	future	experiments.		
Whether	or	not	the	impact	of	the	orienting	reflex	on	the	accumulator’s	sensitivity	is	adaptive	or	
maldapative	depends	on	the	task	context	and	the	event	that	elicits	the	orienting	reflex.	For	the	
evaluation	whether	an	unexpected	external	event	is	potentially	threatening,	disengagement	from	
the	task	at	hand	and	orienting	are	highly	adaptive.	Only	for	errors	in	activities	requiring	to	keep	
attention	focused	to	repetitively	occurring	specific	stimuli	in	a	reduced	environment,	transient	
disengagement	of	selective	attention	from	task-relevant	input	followed	by	re-engagement	appears	
to	be	maladaptive.	Notably,	these	activities	have	become	substantially	more	common	with	the	
development	of	modern	technology.	
Besides	investigating	the	generalizability	of	the	current	findings	to	response	conflict	tasks,	future	
research	needs	to	investigate	the	exact	time	course	of	the	detrimental	and	facilitating	post-error	
effects	on	accumulation	of	sensory	evidence.	What	is	the	interplay	of	neuromodulators	influencing	
arousal	and	selective	attention?	Moreover,	when	measuring	post-error	adaptation,	accuracy	not	only	
of	the	first	but	also	of	the	next	following	trials	should	be	taken	into	account.	
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Purcell	and	Kiani	have	introduced	a	new	perspective	on	early	post-error	adjustments	that	call	for	
revisions	of	standard	models	of	cognitive	control	and	new	exciting	experiments.	
	
 
	
Figure	1.	
Hypothetical	time	course	of	post-error	adjustments	affecting	the	accuracy	of	evidence	accumulation	
positively	(plotted	upwards)	and	negatively	(plotted	downwards).	Errors	detected	by	the	
performance	monitoring	system	presumably	elicit	an	orienting	reflex	that	entails	early	general	
adjustments	reflected	in	a	reduced	sensitivity	and	increased	decision	boundaries/decreased	urgency.	
Task-specific	increases	of	selective	attention	appear	to	take	effect	later,	sometimes	only	several	trials	
after	the	error.	This	time	course	predicts	that	with	short	inter-trial	intervals,	post-error	slowing	is	
strong	and	associated	with	reduced	or	unchanged	accuracy.	
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